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UNITED STATES V. MARTIGNON: COURT
YANKS THE "POWER" PLUG ON THE FEDERAL
ANTIBOOTLEGGING LAW
This government is acknowledged by all, to be one
of enumerated powers.... [T]hat principle is now
universally admitted. But the question respecting
the extent of the powers actually granted, is
perpetually arising, and will probably continue to
arise, so long as our system shall exist.'

I. INTRODUCTION

A national banking system, home-grown wheat, and live musical
performances - what could these three unrelated subjects possibly
have in common? In a word: power. Who has it, to what extent
and from what authority is the power derived? To paraphrase
singer Cyndi Lauper, power changes everything.2 Take, for
example, laws enacted by Congress. Those laws will stand or fall
depending on whether Congress acts within its enumerated
constitutional grants of power. Generally speaking, those powers
are broad.3 In 1819, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
2. See lyrics at http://www.lyricsfreak.com/c/cyndi-lauper/35163.html (last
visited April 16, 2005).
3. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. The Court stated:
[W]e find the great powers, to lay and collect taxes; to borrow
money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war;
and to raise and support armies and navies. The sword and the
purse, all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion
of the industry of the nation, are intrusted [sic] to its
government.
Id. See also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57 (2003). "No
elaborate explanation is needed to make evident the broad impact of commercial
lending on the national economy or Congress's power to regulate that activity
pursuant to the Commerce Clause." Id. See also United States v. Morrison, 529
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had the power to enact legislation creating a national banking
system even though its enumerated powers nowhere expressly
mentioned the word "bank."'4 More than a century later, in 1942,
the Court again gave an expansive interpretation to Congress's
power, ruling that Congress was within its authority when it
enacted legislation to regulate the amount of wheat that farmers
could grow for their own use.' The power enjoyed by Congress,
however, is not without its limits. For example, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Morrison held that domestic violence
lacked the requisite nexus to interstate commerce and, therefore,
Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause
in enacting the legislation at issue.6
U.S. 598, 640 (2000). "[F]or significant periods of our history, the Court has
defined the commerce power as plenary." Id.
4. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406. The Court stated:
Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of
establishing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no
phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of
confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and
which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and
minutely described.
!d. The Court determined that one such source for incidental and implied
powers is the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause and held that
Congress, pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, was within its
constitutional authority in establishing a national banking system. Id. at 411-12,
425. Specifically, the Clause reads, "To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
5. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that a single act of
growing wheat for personal use must be viewed in the aggregate, when viewed
in the aggregate affects interstate commerce, and accordingly is within the
power of Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause). The clause
provides Congress with the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 3.
6. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (holding that Congress lacks power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate violence against women because it does not fall
within the three areas in which Congress can regulate interstate commerce,
those areas are the channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of
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As it always does, the power question resurfaced, this time in
reference to a federal statute criminalizing the unauthorized
recording of live musical performances. In 2004, the Southern
District Court of New York in United States v. Martignon struck
down 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, the federal criminal antibootlegging
statute, as an act that exceeded Congress's powers.7
The
Martignon decision, however, is wrong. If anything, the court
appeared to be on a witch hunt, determined to pull the plug on the
antibootlegging statute no matter how far afield it had to stray to
strike it down. Nothing was going to save that statute. Not the
Copyright Clause, not the Commerce Clause - not any clause.8
"Congress may not, if the Copyright Clause does not allow for
such legislation, enact the law under a separate grant of power,
even when that separate grant provides proper authority."9 Within
months the flawed reasoning spread to the West Coast where a
district court, citing to Martignon, struck down 17 U.S.C § 1101,
the civil counterpart of the federal criminal antibootlegging law."°

interstate commerce, and intrastate activities having substantial effects on
interstate commerce. Moreover, as to the third category, which is the only
category that might be applicable, no nexus had been established showing a
relationship between violence against women and its having a substantial effect
on interstate commerce). The Court, in a separate analysis, held that regulating
violence against women exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 619-24 (noting that Section 5
provides Congress with authority to regulate activities of state actors, not private
actors).
.7. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (2004).
8., Id. at 425 n. 15. "Congress may not enact copyright-like legislation under
any clause when such legislation conflicts with an express limitation.., of the
Copyright Clause." Id.
9. Id.
10. KISS Catalog v. Passport Int'l Prod., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (2004). The
case involved a 1976 live performance of the rock group KISS held at the New
Jersey Roosevelt Stadium as part of the group's concert tour "Spirit of '76." Id.
at 825. A recording of the performance was made for the group as a "workmade-for-hire" by the concert promoter and was then licensed in 2003 to
Passport International Productions, of California, which packaged the film
footage of the live concert into DVD format labeled "KISS: The Lost Concert"
and began selling the DVDs to the public. Id. KISS filed suit asserting several
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This article attempts to halt the damage before it spreads even
further.
Part II distinguishes among the terms used by the music industry
to describe wrongful acts relating to musical works, reviews the
origin and substance of the federal antibootlegging statutes, " and
summarizes what appears to be the first constitutional challenge to
the statute, United States v. Moghadam. 2 Part III tracks the
court's reasoning in Martignon, the principal case of this article.
Part IV follows with a critical analysis of the Martignon decision.
Part V discusses the harsh criticism of the federal antibootlegging
statute and urges that the lack of popularity of a law does not
equate to unconstitutionality. Lastly, the article concludes that
even though the subject of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, live musical
performances, is a form of intellectual property, the statute is not a
copyright law. It does not create a new exclusive right under
Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976." Rather, it creates a
claims, including violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1101(3) (2005), the federal civil
antibootlegging statute. Id. After reciting and adopting wholesale the reasoning
of the Martignon decision, the court reached the same flawed conclusion as that
reached in Martignon, that Congress lacked the power to enact the statute and
accordingly the KISS court declared Section 1101 unconstitutional. Id. at 82737.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2005); 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2005).
12. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
that 18 U.S.C. § 2319A had a sufficient connection to interstate and foreign
commerce to survive under the Commerce Clause), reh 'g and reh 'g en banc
denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11 th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000).
13. Section 106 grants to copyright holders the following six exclusive
rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
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new cause of action that provides redress for the unauthorized
appropriation of live musical performances, an activity that
substantially affects interstate and foreign commerce and
accordingly is well within Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause. If and when appealed, the appellate court should reverse
the Martignon ruling - a ruling that struck down the law arguably
by virtue of the statute's unpopularity rather than by virtue of any
valid basis for a finding of unconstitutionality.
II. BACKGROUND

A. DistinguishingBootleggingfrom Piracy and Counterfeiting
The Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA")"4
provides an instructive framework for recognizing four distinct
categories that are often blurred and lumped together under the
broad term of "piracy":
(1) pirate recordings, which include only
unauthorized duplications of legitimate sound
recording; (2) counterfeit recording, which goes a
step further by including unauthorized duplication
of the sound recording as well as unauthorized
duplication of the original artwork, label and
publicly;

(5) in

the case

of literary,

musical,

dramatic,

and

choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or

sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
14. The RIAA is a trade group representing the U.S. recording industry and
having as part of its mission the worldwide protection of the intellectual
property rights of artists. At http://www.riaa.com/about/default.asp (last visited
April 16, 2005).
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packaging; (3) bootleg (or "underground")
recordings, which are unauthorized recordings of a
live concert or live musical broadcast on television
or radio; and, (4) online piracy, downloading or
streaming a recording from an Internet site. 5
The group's Web site contrasts yesteryear's pirates with modernday pirates:
No black flags with skull and crossbones, no
cutlasses, cannons, or daggers identify today's
pirates. You can't see them coming; there's no
warning shot across your bow. Yet rest assured the
pirates are out there because today there is plenty of
gold (and platinum and diamonds) to be had.
Today's pirates operate not on the high seas but on
the Internet, in illegal CD factories, distribution
centers, and on the street. The pirate's credo is still
the same-why pay for it when it's so easy to steal?
The credo is as wrong as it ever was. Stealing is
still illegal, unethical, and all too frequent in
today's digital age. That is why RIAA continues to
fight music piracy. 16

According to RIAA, the recording industry loses an estimated
$4.2 billion yearly to piracy worldwide. 7 The importance of
correctly understanding the distinction among the terms is
illustrated, for example, in Dowling v. United States. 8 At the
outset, the Court distinguished bootlegging from piracy, 9 but later
cited to legislation that it mistakenly believed addressed
bootlegging: "[B]y the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act
15. At http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited April 16,
2005).

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Dowling v.United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).

Id.
at211 n.2.
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of 1982 ... Congress chose to address the problem of bootlegging
and piracy of records, tapes, and films by imposing felony
penalties on such activities. 20° The Piracy and Counterfeiting
Amendments Act ("PCAA"), however, targets counterfeit copies
of phonorecords, computer programs, motion pictures, or other
audiovisual works, all of which require that the underlying work
already exists in a copyright protected copy from which the
counterfeit copies are then made. 2' In contrast and as discussed
above, bootlegging is the unauthorized recording of live musical
performances, an act not covered by the PCAA.
B. Fillingthe Gap
The court in Moghadam observed that a gap existed when the
subject was one of live musical performances.2 2 Certainly, as
remains true today, some protection could be had at the state level.
An estimated thirty states as well as the District of Columbia have
some form of antibootlegging protection.23 Legal theories relied
upon for state-based actions include the right of publicity,
misappropriation, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. 24 At
least one state has statutory protection specific to live musical
20. Id. at 224. The Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act, Pub. L. No.
97-108, 96 Stat. 91, is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (2005). Id. at n.21.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2318(a) and (c)(3) (2005).
22. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272.
23. Brief for the United States at 11, Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (1999) (No.
98-2180) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT BRIEF].
24. David W. Melville, Harvey S. Perlman, Protection for Works of
Authorship Through the Law of Unfair Competition: Right of Publicity and
Common Law Copyright Reconsidered, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 363 (1998).
Although acknowledging common law copyright as a recourse for subject
matter not falling within the scope of federal copyright law, the authors advance
an argument essentially to limit protection of all works of authorship to two
areas of law, federal copyright and state trade secret law. Id. "Only federal
copyright law and state trade secret law provide a coherent and principled
boundary between property rights in works of authorship and the public
domain." Id. at 408. See also Gregory S. Donat, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright
With Teeth for ImprovisationalPerformers, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1371
(1997).
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performances. A California statute imposes up to one year
imprisonment and a fine of up to $25,000 for anyone convicted of
transporting, for monetary or other consideration, any article
containing sounds of a live performance with knowledge that the
sounds were recorded without consent. 25
With the advent of foreign trade, however, a patchwork of state
laws was bound to prove inadequate.26 In its amicus brief in
Moghadam, the RIAA stressed the need to move beyond the hitor-miss framework of state laws, noting that "[t]he bootlegging of
musical performances is a serious national and international
problem for the United States' recording industry, which is a major
sector of the U.S. economy. 2' 7 Arguably, the need was or should
have been obvious in Dowling, a case that involved the interstate
transport of bootlegged copies of Elvis Presley performances.2 8
There, the governrpent attempted to secure convictions pursuant to
the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA").29 The court rejected
the claim on the basis that the property stolen, the performances,
constituted intangible property and not physical "goods" as is
required to trigger the NSPA.30
In 1994, bootlegging finally received its due.
Although
representing only a minor portion thereof, bootlegging was
included in comprehensive international trade agreements resulting

25.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 653 (criminalizing the
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 653u

materials).

transporting of bootlegged

(criminalizing the act of

recording a live performance). For an interesting application of common law
copyright as it relates to theater and stage performance, see Ferris v. Frohman,
223 U.S. 424 (1912) (noting that the heart of the claim was that Ferris, a
resident of Illinois, allegedly produced a pirated copy of the play "The Fatal
Card").
26. Amicus Brief for the RIAA at 4, United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d
1269 (1999) (No. 98-2180) [hereinafter RIAA BRIEF].
27. Id. at 4.
28. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 209.
29. Id. at 208. The National Stolen Property Act (NSPA) prohibits
transporting in interstate or foreign commerce stolen goods valued at $5,000 or
more. Id. (citing to 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2005)).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2005).
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from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 3"
Congress implemented its trade obligations through passage of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA").32 Spanning nearly
two-hundred pages, the Act includes codification of portions of the
Trade-Related
Aspects
of Intellectual
Property
Rights
("TRIPS").33 Specifically, Article 14 of TRIPS calls for member
parties to enact legislation to protect musical performers from
unauthorized recording of live performances. 3 4 Pursuant to Article
1, members are free to determine within their own legal system the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS.35
Congress elected to create a criminal cause of action codified in
Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) and a civil cause of
action codified as a separate stand-alone chapter in Title 17
(Copyrights).36
1. The FederalCriminalAntibootlegging Statute

Section 2319A of Title 18 makes bootlegging a criminal offense
37
subject to a maximum five-year prison sentence, a fine, or both.
31. H.R. REP. No. 103-826 (I), at 4 (1994). The negotiations marked the
bringing together of discussions that had started in 1986 among 125 countries
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Id. at 10. The
talks were memorialized into multilateral agreements and signed by 111
countries, including the United States, on April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh,
Morocco. Id. See also Susan M. Deas, Jazzing up the Copyright Act?
Resolving the Uncertainties of the United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567, 582-88 (1988) (providing a chronology from
the Berne Convention and Rome Convention through to the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations). For a detailed discussion of the historical
development of GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO), see Kevin C.
Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 421 (1998).
32. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
33. Id. at §§ 512 and 513.
34. See TRIPS, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips_ le.
htm (last visited April 16, 2005).
35. Id.
36. 18 U.S.C. 2319A (2005); 17 U.S.C. 1101 (2005).
37. 18 U.S.C. 2319A(a) (2005). Subsequent offenses can result in a prison
term of up to ten years. Id.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

9

DePaul
Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
356

DEPAULJ.ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XV: 347

The statute targets four acts: the unauthorized fixation of sounds
or the sounds and images of a live musical performance; the
unauthorized transmitting or communicating to the public of such
sounds or sounds and images; the distributing, selling, renting or
trafficking in copies that are made from the unauthorized recording
of live musical performances; and the unauthorized act of offering
to sell, distribute, or rent such copies. 38 To obtain a conviction, the
following elements must be met: (1) a live musical performance;
(2) lack of performers' consent; (3) knowledge; (4) the act of
recording, transmitting, distributing or offering to distribute, sell,
or rent; and (5) doing so for the purpose of commercial advantage
or private financial gain.
The statute mandates forfeiture and destruction of any copies
made in violation of the act as well as forfeiture and destruction of
plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, and film negatives used in
making the unauthorized copies.4" In recognition of the global

38. Id. Section 2319A provides in relevant part:
(a) Offense.-Whoever, without the consent of the performer
or performers involved, knowingly and for purposes of
commercial advantage or private financial gain(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical
performance in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies
or phonorecords of such a performance from an unauthorized
fixation;
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the
sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance;
or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell,
rents or offers to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord
fixed as described in paragraph (1), regardless of whether the
fixations occurred in the United States;
shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years or fined in the
amount set forth in this title, or both, or if the offense is a
second or subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned for not
more than 10 years or fined in the amount set forth in this
title, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2005).
39. Id.
40.- 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(b) (2005).
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dimension of bootlegging, the statute provides that any
unauthorized copies of live musical performances made outside of
the United States will be subject to the same seizure and forfeiture
rules applicable to property imported into the United States in
violation of the U.S. customs laws. 4
2. The FederalCivil Remedy Antibootlegging Statute
Congress also created a civil cause of action for bootlegging of
live musical performances. Codified as a separate chapter within
the 1976 Copyright Act, Chapter 11 mirrors the criminal
antibootlegging law with respect to the acts prohibited. 42 The
substantive difference is that the civil cause of action does not
require the acts be done for the purpose of commercial advantage
or private financial gain, as is required for a criminal conviction.43
The civil cause of action incorporates by reference the remedies
available to a plaintiff who is successful in a copyright

infringement action - injunctive relief, impoundment of the
offending materials, damages, and, at the court's discretion, costs
and attorney fees.'

Section 1101 further provides that nothing in

41. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(c) (2005).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2005).
43. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) ("Anyone who, without the consent of the
performer or performers involved") with 18 U.S.C. 2319A (a) ("Whoever,
without the consent of the performer or performers involved, knowingly andfor
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain") (emphasis
added).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 1101. Section 1101 provides as follows:
(a) Unauthorized Acts.-Anyone who, without the consent of
the performer or performers involved(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical
performance in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies
or phonorecords of such a performance from an unauthorized
fixation,
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the
sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance,
or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell,
rents or offers to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord
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Chapter 11 preempts state laws relating to live musical
performers. 45 This is in contrast to the Copyright Act of 1976,

which specifically provides for preemption of state copyright laws
that are equivalent
copyright. 6

to

the

protection

afforded

by federal

C. The First ConstitutionalChallenge
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit addressed what appears to have
been the first challenge to Congress's antibootlegging efforts with
the defendant appealing the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court
and the Supreme Court denying certiorari. 17
The case began in 1997 when a Florida grand jury returned an
indictment against Ali Moghadam for violation of 18 U.S.C.
§2319A for trafficking in bootleg sound recordings of live musical
performances of Tori Amos, the Beastie Boys, and the Grateful
Dead.48 The facts indicated that someone other than Moghadam
engaged in the unauthorized recording of the live performances,
fixed as described in paragraph (1), regardless of whether the
fixations occurred in the United States,
shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections 502
through 505, to the same extent as an infringer of copyright.
(b) Definition.-As used in this section, the term "traffic in"
means transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another,
as consideration for anything of value, or make or obtain
control of with intent to transport, transfer, or dispose of.
(c) Applicability.-This section shall apply to any act or acts
that occur on or after the date of the enactment of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act.
(d) State Law Not Preempted.-Nothing in this section may
be construed to annul or limit any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2005).
45. 17U.S.C.§ 1101(d)(2005).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2005) (Preemption with respect to other laws).
47. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269.
"The constitutionality of the antibootlegging statute appears to be a question of first impression in the nation."
Id. at 1271.
48. GoVERNMENT BRIEF, supranote 23, at 3.
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but that Moghadam had obtained the bootlegged copies knowing

they were unauthorized, sent them to yet another party to convert
them from digital audiotape ("DAT") format to compact disc
("CD") format, and then planned to sell the CDs at a profit.49
Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. §2319A (a)(3) was applicable. In August
1997, Moghadam entered a guilty plea."
In November he was
sentenced to two years of probation and an $8,000 fine." The day
of his sentencing he filed an appeal, asserting that the statute was
unconstitutional because Congress lacked power under any of its
Article 1, Section 8 grants of power to enact the law."5
The district court rejected Moghadam's claim and the Eleventh

Circuit affirmed, ruling that Congress had authority to enact the
statute pursuant to the Commerce Clause.

3

In his appeal to the

Eleventh Circuit, Moghadam argued that: (1) the statute cannot
derive authority from the Copyright Clause54 because a live
musical performance is not fixed as required by the "Writings"
term; and (2) the Commerce Clause cannot serve as an alternative
source of authority because the statute's legislative history
contains no findings to support a connection between bootlegging
49. Id. at 3-5. An RIAA press release dated April 10, 2000 stated the
following:
Moghadam was one of 17 individuals indicted as a result of
Operation Goldmine, an undercover U.S. Customs case in
which approximately 800,000 bootleg CDs were confiscated.
The majority of the bootlegs were manufactured outside of the
U.S. but intended for distribution in this country. Seven of the
defendants were from foreign countries and 10 from the
United States.
Supreme Court Upholds Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute at http://www.riaa.co
m/news/newsletter/press2000/041000.asp (last visited April 16, 2005).
50. GOVERNMENT BRIEF, supra note 23, at 3-5.
51. Id. at 3-4 (noting further that Moghadam confirmed to the court that he
was pleading guilty for the simple reason he was guilty).
52. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271.
53. Id. at 1270.
54. The Clause provides Congress with the authority, "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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and commerce." The government defended the statute arguing
that Congress had a rational basis for regulating the activity of
bootlegging due to its effect on interstate commerce, that
enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A and its civil counterpart comports
with international norms as established by TRIPS, and that the lack
of legislative history is to be expected given the fact that Congress
permissibly used fast-track procedures when enacting the URAA.56
Initially, the court fell into the trap of viewing the statute as a
rights-creating law which caused the court to grapple with how to
characterize the alleged "rights," stating first that they appeared to
be "hybrid rights" and later offering that perhaps they are "best
described as 'quasi-copyright' or sui generis protections."57
Continuing down this wrong path, the court speculated that the
only right that appeared to be created by 18 U.S.C. § 2319A is the
one's [live]
and/or re-communicate
right to "record
58
performance."
In entertaining the defendant's Copyright Clause
argument, the court discussed whether live musical performances
could fit within the broad definition of Writings, but declined to
render a decision on this issue.59
Because this paper asserts that the federal antibootlegging
statutes are not rights-creating laws, any debate about satisfying
the Writings requirement, however interesting, is ultimately
irrelevant to the constitutionality of the statutes. This is also true
of the question raised, but likewise not addressed, in Moghadam as
to "limited Times," with the court suggesting that the protection
afforded by Section 2319A appears to be of an indefinite
duration.6" Here, the court was again misled into viewing the
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271.
GOVERNMENT BRIEF, supra note 23, at 9-12.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272-73.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1274, n.9.
We note that the anti-bootlegging statute may be faced with
another constitutional problem under the Copyright Clause.
The Clause allows Congress to extend protection to authors
only for [limited Times. The protection afforded to live
performances by § 2319A, however, contains no express time
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statute as a law that creates a new right when what it creates is a
new criminal offense, also discussed in Part IV.
The court then turned its attention to the Commerce Clause and,
citing to supporting authority, rightly dismissed as immaterial the
fact that Congress did not expressly state it was acting pursuant to
the Commerce Clause or that Congress mistakenly believed it was
operating under the Copyright Clause. 6 The court further cited
authority supporting its determination that the lack of legislative
findings in the record and lack of a jurisdictional element within
the text of 18 U.S.C. §2819A are not fatal to the validity of the
law.62
Because Congress thought it was acting under the
Copyright Clause, predictably there are no
legislative findings in the record regarding the
effect of bootlegging of live musical performances
on interstate or foreign commerce. Such findings
are normally helpful to a court in finding an
interstate commerce nexus. However, the lack of
such findings does not rule out the Commerce
Clause as a possible source of legislative authority
applicable to the statute under challenge.63

Section 2319A clearly prohibits conduct that has a
substantial effect on both commerce between the
several states and commerce with foreign nations.
The link between bootleg compact discs and
interstate commerce and commerce with foreign
nations is self-evident....

If bootlegging is done

for financial gain, it necessarily is intertwined with
commerce. Bootleggers suppress the legitimate
limitation and would arguably persist indefinitely.

Id.
61. Id. at 1275.
62. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275.
63. Id. at 1275.
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markets because demand is satisfied through
unauthorized channels.' 4
Lastly, the court, again falling into the "this is a copyright law"
trap, addressed the defendant's contention that Congress could not,
under the Commerce Clause, do what it lacked authority to do
under the Copyright Clause. The defendant insisted that the
antibootlegging criminal statute was a copyright law and that
Congress skirted the limitations of the Copyright Clause by now
invoking its commerce powers to enact 18 U.S.C. § 231 9A.65
The court began its analysis on this issue with the general rule
that the constitutional grants of power given to Congress are standalone grants and are to be analyzed independently.66 The court
stated, "In other words, each of the powers of Congress is
alternative to all of the other powers, and what cannot be done
under one of them may very well be doable under another."67 The
court cited to Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States68 and
South Dakota v. Dole69 in support of the general proposition that
the limitations of one grant of authority do not have any bearing on
whether the legislation can be sustained under another grant of
power." The court correctly noted that the Trade-Mark Cases of
1879 are distinguishable because commerce was not developed to
the extent it is today, and accordingly the lack of a jurisdictional
64. Id. at 1276.
65. Id. at 1277. "The more difficult question in this case is whether Congress
can use its Commerce Clause power to avoid the limitations that might prevent
it from passing the same legislation under the Copyright Clause." Id.
66. Id.
67. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277.
68. Id. (citing to 379 U.S. 241) (holding that the public accommodations
provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act had sufficient connection to interstate
commerce to be valid under the Commerce Clause, and thus not engaging in
analysis as to whether the provision could also be sustained under Congress's
Section 5 enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment).
69. Id. (citing to 483 U.S. 203) (holding that the Spending Clause allows
Congress to condition appropriation of money to states on restrictions that
Congress could not impose directly on states under its other grants of power).
70. Id. at 1277.
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element in the trademark legislation at issue in 1879 was sufficient
to cause the statute to fail as a legitimate exercise of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.71
The court underscored its conclusion that the Trade-Mark Cases
support the general rule that limitations in one clause do not
transfer into another clause.
The analysis in the Trade-Mark Cases tends to
refute the argument that Congress is automatically
forbidden from extending protection under some
other grant of legislative authority to works that
may not be constitutionally protected under the
Copyright Clause. Indeed, modem trademark law is
built entirely on the Commerce Clause.72
The court buttressed its analysis with Authors League of America
Inc. v. Oman, where, under the Commerce Clause, the Second
Circuit upheld the validity of a statute that essentially protected
American publishing companies from imported published
materials.73 The court arrived at this holding irrespective of the
fact that the provision was codified in Title 17 (Copyrights).74
The court then became troubled by a Supreme Court decision
that it believed created tension with the line of cases cited up to
that point in its analysis. The court observed that in Railway
Labor Executives' Association v. Gibbons,7 5 the Supreme Court
held that the Commerce Clause could not sustain a bankruptcy
statute that directly conflicted with the "uniformity" requirement
of the Bankruptcy Clause." Railway Labor, as will be examined
in Part IV, becomes the linchpin of the ruling in Martignon and in

71. Id. at 1278.

72. Id. at 1278-79 (citing to Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716
F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1983)).
73. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279 (citing to Authors League of America, Inc.
v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986) and to 17 U.S.C. § 601)).

74. Id.
75. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
76. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279-80 (citing to 455 U.S. 457 (1982)).
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KISS Catalog v. PassportInternationalProducts,77 which blindly
followed Martignon 's misguided footsteps.
Returning to Moghadam, the court resolved what it perceived as
tension between the cases by engaging in a "fundamentally
inconsistent" analysis: even if the Copyright Clause does not
directly speak to the issue of bootlegging, extending protection to
live musical performances actually complements and is in
harmony with the existing scheme Congress has established under
the Copyright Clause.78
The court additionally called attention to what is an illogical
result under present copyright law with respect to Writings and
accordingly further undermines a challenge to the antibootlegging
statute.
If a live performance is broadcast, e.g., by radio or
television, and simultaneously recorded by the
performer, any unauthorized recording by a person
receiving the broadcast constitutes copyright
infringement of the sound recording or motion
picture, notwithstanding that the infringer actually
copied the live performance directly, and not the
fixation thereof.79
The court then noted the obvious - that even though the live
musical performance is not fixed at the time it is being performed,
it becomes fixed immediately upon the bootlegged copy having
been made.8" Satisfied that there is no fundamental inconsistency
with the Writings and finding that the activity of bootlegging
meets the commerce "substantial effects" test, the court held that
18 U.S.C. § 2319A is valid under the Commerce Clause, but left
77. KISS Catalog v. Passport Int'l Prod., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (2004).
78. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
79. Id. (emphasis added) (noting also that the definition of "fixed" in 17
U.S.C. § 101 creates a legal fiction with respect to live performances that are
transmitted with the definitional phrase "is fixed for purposes of this title if a
fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.").
80. Id. at 1280-81.
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open the question as to whether it violates the "limited Times"
constraint of the Copyright Clause."' Five years later, the Southern
District Court of New York addressed the issue left open in
Moghadam, but engaged in flawed reasoning that led to the wrong
conclusion.
III. UNITED STATES V. MAR TIGNON
Factually similar to Moghadam, in Martignon a New York
business operator named Jean Martignon was indicted for violating
18 U.S.C. § 2319A by selling unauthorized recordings of live
musical performances through his business Midnight Records.8 2
In what appeared to be a sting operation, Martignon was arrested
by federal and state law enforcement agents in September 2003."
Martignon moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that 18
U.S.C. § 2319A was unconstitutional in that it violated both the
"limited Times" and the "Writings" requirements of the Copyright
Clause.84

After reciting background material from Moghadam, the court
addressed the issue the Moghadam court declined to address whether 18 U.S.C. § 2319A offends the Copyright Clause both as
81. Id. at 1282. The court contradicts itself as to the Writings requirement.
"We hold that the Copyright Clause does not envision that Congress is
positively forbidden from extending copyright-like protection under other
constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to works of authorship
that may not meet the fixation requirement inherent in the term 'Writings."' Id.
at 1280. However, in the conclusion the court states, "Summarizing our narrow
holding in this case, we assume arguendo, without deciding, that the antibootlegging statute cannot satisfy the fixation requirement of the Copyright
Clause." Id. at 1282.
82. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 417. Martignon operated a brick-andmortar business, Midnight Records, and a catalog service and an Internet
website. Id. at 417.
83. Id.

84. Id. Martignon further challenged the statute on grounds that it violated
the First Amendment and the basic tenets of federalism incorporated in the
Tenth Amendment as to powers reserved to the states, however, because the
court held the law unconstitutional as to the Copyright Clause, the court did not
address these arguments. Id. at 430, n.22.
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to its "Writings" and its "limited Times" requirement.85 The
court's analysis proceeded in the framework of four questions: (1)
whether the statute is a copyright law or a commercial regulation;
(2) if a copyright law, whether the statute is a proper exercise of
Congress's authority under the Copyright Clause; (3) if not
sustainable under the Copyright Clause, whether Congress, in the
alternative, may enact the legislation pursuant to its Commerce
Clause powers; and, (4) even if the Commerce Clause could
sustain the statute, whether the statute nonetheless is
fundamentally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause and thus
unconstitutional notwithstanding the Commerce Clause as a source
of authority. 86

Acknowledging that it is immaterial whether Congress operates
under an incorrect belief as to its source of authority when
enacting legislation, the court stated that it remains essential to
properly classify a statute to ensure that it does not conflict with
any constitutional limitations.87 The court concluded from the
outset that the criminal offense of bootlegging is "copyright-like"
legislation and attempted to support its conclusion by looking to
events surrounding its enactment and its legislative history.88
After reciting historical facts relating to the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the court extracted as relevant the
fact that the TRIPS agreement, one of several agreements resulting
from the negotiations, dealt with intellectual property and that the
antibootlegging statute was an outgrowth from the TRIPS
agreement. Next, the court asserted that a plain reading of the
words of the statute makes evident that the statute's purpose is the
same as the purpose of the Copyright Clause: to promote the
advancement of arts and science through exclusive rights that
allow for personal gain to authors and inventors.89 The court cited
to that portion of the statute which reads, "without the consent of
85. Id. at 419-20.
86. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
87. Id. at 419-20.
88. Id. at 420. "If the anti-bootlegging statute is a copyright-like statute, as
this Court finds that it is." Id.
89. Id. at 420.
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the performer or performers involved"
"synonymous purpose" conclusion. 9

as

supporting

its

The court then noted that the Senate Report discussing TRIPS
came from the Committee on the Judiciary, which along with
language in the report "underscores the purpose of TRIPS was to
'ensure that critical enforcement procedures would be available in
91
each member country to safeguard intellectual property rights."'
Then, the court summarily concluded that simply because the
statute emanated from an international agreement does not render
92
it constitutional.
The court further cited to the report's use of the sub-heading
"Copyright Provisions" and to a sentence noting that TRIPS
obligates members "to allow performers to prevent the
unauthorized fixation in sound recordings or music videos of their
live performances and to prevent reproduction of such
'
recordings."93
The court then observed that notably absent from
the report was any discussion of commerce. Next, it asserted that
Congress' placement of the civil antibootlegging statute (not the
statute at issue in the case) within Title 17 was proof of an
unquestionable link to copyright law."94 With these tiny morsels
in hand, the court triumphantly declared that, irrespective of any
ancillary benefits the statute brings to interstate commerce, the
statute was enacted to "cloak artists with copyright-like
protection" and thus is a copyright law and cannot be sustained
under the Commerce Clause. 95
90. Id.
91. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21 (citing to S. REP. No. 103-412, at
224 (1994)).
92. Id. at 421.
93. Id. (citing to S. REP. No. 103-412, at 225 (1994)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 421-22. "The COJ [Committee on the Judiciary] simply failed to
recognize, let alone master, one of the central problems here - that an
unrecorded live musical performance is not a writing." Id. at 421.
This court does not refute the Moghadam Court's finding that
bootlegging has a 'deleterious economic effect on the
recording industry.' But, this Court does not believe that
simply because a piece of legislation has commercial
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The court found that the statute runs doubly afoul of the
Copyright Clause because live musical performances are not fixed
and thus do not satisfy the Writings requirement and the lack of a
time duration equates to perpetual rights in violation of the
requisite "limited Times. 96
The court next turned its attention to the third question: Whether
Congress could enact 18 U.S.C. § 2319A under its commerce
powers. The court concluded that Congress is prohibited not only
from using its Commerce Clause powers, but from using any of its
other enumerated powers to enact the antibootlegging legislation.
The court cited Railway Labor Executives' Ass 'n v. Gibbons 9
in support of its conclusion that "Congress may not side-step the
Copyright Clause's limitations through legislating under the
Commerce Clause." 98 The court dismisses as inapposite the
Supreme Court decision in the Trade-Mark Cases and the Second
Circuit ruling in Authors League ofAmerica.99
Finally, the court engaged in further circular reasoning by
concluding that even if Congress could enact the antibootlegging
statute under the Commerce Clause the statute would still be
unconstitutional because it would be "fundamentally inconsistent"
with the Writings and "limited Times" requirements of the
Copyright Clause. By pursing this line of argument, the court was
returning to its prior arguments that live musical performances are
not "fixed" and the "protection" afforded to performers under 18
U.S.C. §2319A appears to be "perpetual.""1 ° This, of course, was
premised entirely upon the court's initial finding that the criminal
offense of bootlegging is copyright or copyright-like legislation, a

consequences, advantages, or even intentions, the legislation
loses its 'Copyright' identity and becomes a 'Commercial'
statute not subject to the strictures of the Copyright Clause.
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
96. Id. at 423.
97. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
98. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
99. Id. (citing to In Re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) and Authors
League of America, Inc., v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986)).
100. Id. at 423.
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finding that falls flat upon closer analysis.
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Classification of the Statute
The Martignon decision is wrong with its flawed logic flowing
throughout the opinion and leaving in its wake a trail of incorrect
conclusions each built upon an equally flawed prior conclusion.
Like a line of dominoes, the flawed logic topples at the slightest
touch.
The court built its first conclusion, that 18 U.S.C. § 2319A is a
copyright-like law, upon the statute's language, legislative history
and its placement within the United States Code."' The court
extracted from the statutory text the words "without the consent of
the performer or performers involved" as clear evidence that the
purpose of the statute is one and the same as the purpose of the
Copyright Clause."0 2 What the court elected to ignore is the word
"offense," the statute's criminal penalty provisions, and its
location within Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), all of
which give clear notice that the law is a criminal statute."0 3
Next, similar to someone seeking water in the desert, the court
grasped in earnest at the legislative history to help its cause. The
court, however, failed to state two crucial facts as to the legislative
history: (1) the legislative history is nearly non-existent; and (2)
Congress enacted the law as part of a comprehensive package of
legislation pursuant to fast-track procedure. As Professor Nimmer,
the leading copyright authority, observed: "[G]iven the fast-track
basis on which the legislation passed, there is no such history." 1"
The Moghadam court noted the same: "There is little legislative
history dealing with either provision because the URAA was
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at422.
Id. at 420.
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2005).
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8E.02, at 8E-9 (discussing the federal

antibootlegging statutes).
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rushed through Congress on fast-track procedures.""1 5 Fast-track
procedures are not without their critics, but as some commentators
have observed such procedures also have advantages. 106
Nonetheless, Martignon correctly observed that the sparse history
that did exist suggested that Congress believed it was operating
under the Copyright Clause, but here the court ignored its own
citation to authority for the proposition that it is irrelevant whether
Congress operates under a mistaken belief as to the source of its
authority. 07
'
105. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272.
106. Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast
Track. Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More Than a Name
Change, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 1 (2003).
Fast track is important precisely because it has become a
political symbol of America's commitment to free trade. On
this point, proponents and opponents agree. Even a number of
trading partners claim that they were reluctant to enter into
trade negotiations with the United States, or at least to tackle
sensitive issues, without fast track.
Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
Fast track eliminates some of the greatest obstacles to
agreement approval: (1) interminable debate or filibuster; (2)
amendments that act as "poison pills" or that would require
renegotiation of agreement provisions; (3) and procedures that
can stall legislation in committees or otherwise avoid a vote
by the full House or Senate. Fast track is the product of many
years of rebalancing and refining the responsibilities of the
legislative and executive branches in international trade
policy.
Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted). See also Laura L. Wright, Note, Trade Promotion
Authority: Fast Track for the Twenty-First Century?, 12 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 979 (2004) (positing that the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act
of 2002, the successor to the fast-track procedure, is not as effective as a tool for
United States' participation in international trade negotiations).
107. The court stated:
[T]he government is correct that Congress's belief as to the
power under which it enacts a statute is not dispositive, and
"[a]n otherwise valid exercise of congressional authority is
not, of course, invalidated if Congress happens to recite the
wrong clause[of the Constitution].. .or, indeed, if Congress
recites no clause at all.
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The court also made much ado about the Senate Report subheading "Copyright Provisions," irrespective of the fact that the
Supreme Court has held such items as insignificant in classifying
statutes. For example, in Whitfield v. United States"°8 the Court
rejected an attempt to categorize a federal statute as an amendment
to an existing federal money-laundering criminal statute rather
than a statute that creates a new criminal offense.
Additionally, the court attempted to support its classification of
18 U.S.C. §2319A as "copyright-like" legislation on the lack of
any findings establishing a commerce connection. As Moghadam
observed, given the use of fast-track procedures this omission is
understandable and moreover not fatal to the statute. 109
The Court in Whitfield similarly stated that "it would be a
strange canon of statutory construction that would require
Congress to state in committee reports or elsewhere in its
deliberations that which is obvious on the face of a statute."110
Here, one would be hard-pressed to miss the obvious connection to
commerce. The statute contains the express words "for purposes
of commercial advantage" and "distributes or offers to distribute"
and further states, with express language, that attempts to bring
into the United States bootleg copies of live musical performances
recorded outside of the United States will be "subject to seizure
and forfeiture in the same manner as property imported in
violation of the customs laws."'
Thus, the statutory text does
indeed state the obvious.

Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 419-20 (citing to Laurence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 307 n.6 (2d ed. 1988)).
108. Whitfield v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 687 (2005).
109. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275. "Such findings are normally helpful to a
court in finding an interstate commerce nexus.... However, the lack of such
findings does not rule out the Commerce Clause as a possible source of
legislative authority." Id. (citations omitted).
110. Whitfield, 125 S.Ct. at 692 (citing to Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446
U.S. 578, 592 (1980)).
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319A(a), (a)(3) and (c) (2005).
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B. Sustainability Under the CopyrightClause
Still, the court in Martignon adamantly concluded that the
criminal offense of bootlegging is a "copyright-like" law and from
this erroneous conclusion launched into its Copyright Clause
analysis, the second question in its formulation. Here, it concluded
that the statute "runs doubly afoul" because live musical
performances do not satisfy "Writings" and because the statute
fails to include an express time limitation in contravention of
"limited Times.""' 2 Only if one accepts the court's erroneous
classification of the criminal antibootlegging statute as copyrightlike legislation does the Copyright Clause analysis merit
discussion.
Because this article rejects this incorrect
characterization, its analysis of this portion of the court's opinion
is addressed last.
C. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A Creates a New Cause of Action, Not a New
"Copyright Right "
The Martignon court acknowledged that 18 U.S.C. § 2319A
criminalizes the act of bootlegging by providing criminal penalties
for anyone convicted of committing bootlegging." 3 The court did
not challenge Congress' placement of the statute in Title 18
(Crimes and Criminal Procedure), the title allocated for federal
criminal statutes. Professor Nimmer also recognizes the statute for
what it is. "The statute defines an offense of unauthorized fixation.
If such occurs in the United States, it is actionable.""' 4 The
Martignon court asserted otherwise, stating that the statute "was
enacted primarily to cloak artists with copyright-like
protection."'' Arguably, all criminal statutes indirectly provide
protection in the sense that criminal statutes provide victims of
crimes with a cause of action and provide deterrence through
112. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24.
113. Id. at 418 (noting that the statute provides criminal sanctions for
bootlegging).
114. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §8E.03 at 8E-14.
115. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
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statutory penalties.
The Martignon court, however, took this to an illogical
extension by asserting that this indirect protection constituted a
new exclusive right under the Copyright Act. Applying this logic
to another federal criminal statute, the Federal Kidnapping Act, for
example,6 the federal crime of kidnapping arguably adds a new

right to the Constitution's Bill of Rights. In other words,
individuals have the right not to be kidnapped across state lines. In
keeping with the logic in Martignon, it follows that the Federal
Kidnapping Act could be challenged as unconstitutional because
Congress enacted it directly and, thus, skirted the constitutionally
prescribed procedures for amending the Constitution."7 The
absurdity of this notion should be apparent.
This importance of distinguishing between a cause of action and
a new right was emphasized in a federal appellate decision
involving the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)," 8
which also provides both civil and criminal causes of action. In
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., the court
noted:
The essence of the DMCA's anticircumvention
provisions is that §§ 1201(a), (b) establish causes of
action for liability. They do not establish a new
This distinction between
property right....
Whereas
property and liability is critical.
copyrights, like patents, are property, liability
protection from unauthorized circumvention merely
creates a new cause of action under which a
defendant may be liable." 9
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A creates a cause of action, liability,
for the unauthorized recording of a live musical performance. A
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2005).
117. U.S. CONST. art V.

118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201 - 1205 (2005).
119. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192-93
2004).
(C.A. Fed. Ill.
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live musical performance is a form of intellectual property.12°
However, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A does not create the property interest
in the live musical performance, rather the interest exists in and of
itself as is true of live performances in general.12' It neither arises
from nor is dependent on 18 U.S.C. § 2319A.
It is the
unauthorized recording, essentially theft, of a live musical
performance that is made actionable by 18 U.S.C. § 2319A.
D. SustainabilityUnder the Commerce Clause

The court conceded that the Eleventh Circuit found 18 U.S.C. §
12
2319A constitutional pursuant to Congress' commerce powers1
and further admitted that the requisite commerce connection exists
123
despite the lack of express findings in the legislative record.
The district court, however, attempted to refute this finding by
ascribing to Congress a motive of invoking the Commerce Clause
to intentionally circumvent the Writings and "limited Times"
constraints of the Copyright Clause. 124 The Supreme Court has
expressly admonished against making such bald assertions about
congressional intent, stating that Congress swears to and is bound
by an oath to uphold the Constitution and courts should not lightly
120. One definition of intellectual property is a "category of intangible rights
protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999).
121. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(recognizing that a performer possessed a property right in his live performance
of a human cannonball act and that the surreptitious recording and then
broadcasting of the entire act by a television station constituted an actionable
appropriation of the performer's live performance under Ohio's state law).
"The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a substantial threat to
the economic value of that performance. As the Ohio court recognized, this act
is the product of petitioner's own talents and energy, the end result of much
time, effort, and expense." Id. at 575.
122. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
123. Id. at 422. "This Court does not refute the Moghadam Court's finding
that bootlegging has a 'deleterious economic effect on the recording industry."'
Id.
124. Id. at 428. "Congress may not avoid express limitations on its authority
by acting under a separate grant." Id.
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assume that Congress acted with a purpose to exceed or
circumvent is enumerated powers.'25
Next, in what it believed to be its Ace card, the court cited to
Railway Labor for the proposition that Congress cannot, under any
other power, do what it is not able to do under a specific grant of
authority." 6 A careful reading of Railway Labor reveals the fatal
flaw in the court's interpretation of the decision.
Railway Labor involved the bankruptcy of the Chicago Rock
Island and Pacific Railroad Co. and Congress's enactment of
federal legislation ordering the bankruptcy trustee to pay from the
estate's assets up to $75 million in satisfaction of the railroad's
employee benefit obligations to those Rock Island employees not
hired by other carriers.' 27 Here, and in stark contrast to Martignon,
the Court had a solid basis for classifying the legislation as a
bankruptcy law. First, there was the express statutory language:
"the bankruptcy court shall immediately authorize and direct the
Rock Island trustee to ...
immediately implement such
'
arrangement.
The Court further cited to language in the
legislative history: "[I]t is the intention of Congress that employee
protection be imposed in bankruptcy proceedings involving major
rail carriers, for to do otherwise would be to promote liquidations,
to the detriment of the employees and the public interest."'' 29 It is
only after finding express textual and legislative history supporting
classification of the legislation as a bankruptcy law that the Court
125. I.N.S. v St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 300, n.12 (2001).

As was stated in Hooper v. California, '[t]he elementary rule
is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.' This
approach.., also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is
bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The
courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress
intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or
usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
126. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26.
127. Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 461-62.
128. Id. at 466.
129. Id. at 468.
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analyzed the "uniformity" requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.
Even here, the Court did not impose the rigid interpretation that
the Martignon court gave to the Writings and "limited Times"
terms in the Copyright Clause. 13 The Court struck down the
legislation because, by its very terms, it applied to one specific
bankrupt railroad - the Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railroad
Co. 131

Accordingly, not only did Martignon incorrectly state the
proposition of Railway Labor, it also failed to recognize that
because Railway Labor is distinguishable, its reliance on the case
was misplaced. First, unlike in Railway Labor, neither the
statutory text nor the scant legislative history contains any express
language supporting a finding that 18 U.S.C. § 2319A is
"copyright-like" legislation. Second, such a finding, as Railway
Labor makes clear, is a necessary prerequisite for undertaking
analysis under the relevant clause.
The Martignon court then asserted that the Trade-Mark Cases,
as well as Authors League ofAmerica, fail to undercut its assertion
that Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause as an alternative
source of authority. 312 This is also incorrect. In 1879, when the
Trade-Mark Cases were decided, commerce was mostly an
intrastate activity and therefore the Court found that the lack of a
jurisdictional element rendered the Commerce Clause unavailable
130. Id. at 469.
The uniformity requirement is not a straightjacket...
[M]oreover, [it] permits Congress to treat 'railroad
bankruptcies as a distinctive and special problem' and 'does
not deny Congress power to take into account differences that
exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion
legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems.
Id. (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 470. This correct reading of Ry. Labor is confirmed in In re
Simon, 311 B.R. 641, 646 (2004) (noting that the Supreme Court struck down
the legislation at issue in Ry. Labor because the legislation was enacted solely
for the benefit of employees of a certain bankrupt railroad and could be enforced
only by one bankruptcy court). "The act in question amounted to a private
bankruptcy law." Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 470.
132. Martignon,346 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
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as a source of power to enact the legislation.133 In Author League
of America, the court emphatically held that Section 106 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 was a valid exercise of Congress' power
under its Commerce Clause. Essentially an import restriction on
foreign-manufactured literary works enacted to protect the
domestic printing industry, Section 106 was challenged as
unconstitutional because its purpose did not comport with the
purpose of the Copyright Clause.134 Rightly observing that the
legislation related to foreign commerce, the court responded that
Congress has powers other than that prescribed in the Copyright
Clause. "'
The Martignon opinion is bereft of any authority whatsoever in
support of its contention that if Congress cannot enact legislation
pursuant to one clause, it cannot enact that legislation under any
other clause. As the Moghadam court properly noted, the federal
criminal antibootlegging statute "clearly prohibits conduct that has
a substantial effect on both commerce between the several states
and commerce with foreign nations."' 36 Thus, as Moghadam held,
18 U.S.C § 2319A is a valid exercise of Congress' commerce
powers.
E. "FundamentallyInconsistent,"a Repackagingof "This is
Copyright-Like Legislation"
Turning to the last question in its four-part framework, the
Martignon court concluded that even if Congress could enact 18
U.S.C § 2319A pursuant to the Commerce Clause, it still must fail
because it is "fundamentally inconsistent" with the Copyright

133. 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879) (noting that the Commerce Clause grants
Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the
states and with Indian tribes). "[I]t is reasonable to expect to find on the fact of
the law, or from its essential nature, that it is a regulation of commerce with
foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes." Id.
134. Author League ofAmerica, 790 F.2d at 224.
135. Id.
136. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276.
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Clause.' 37 Here, the court returned to the issue of the "Writings"
and "limited Times" phrases contained in the Copyright Clause.
As is true of all three questions subsequent to the initial inquiry,
this last question is predicated on an acceptance that 18 U.S.C §
2319A is copyright-like legislation.
The court stated:
"Alternatively, even if Congress may enact copyright-like
legislation under grants other than the Copyright Clause, when it
lacks the power under the Copyright Clause, such legislation may
not be 'fundamentally inconsistent' with the fixation and
durational limitations imposed by the Copyright Clause."' 38 This
classification is wrong, which has been clearly demonstrated
above. However, even if one were to accept the classification of
the federal antibootlegging statute as "copyright-like" legislation,
the statute does not offend either Writings or "limited Times."
With respect to Writings, the Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam has
already observed the obvious, that the live musical performance
becomes fixed the moment the unauthorized recording is made. 39
Additionally, the court further observed the "legal fiction" of
fixation created by the Copyright Act of 1976 pursuant to its
definition of "fixed."
A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that
are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this
title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission. This
definition creates a legal fiction that the
simultaneous
fixation
occurs
before
the
transmission and [before] the unauthorized
recording. 40

If a live performance is broadcast, e.g., by radio or
television, and simultaneously recorded by the
137.
138.
139.
140.

Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29.
Id. at 428.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
Id. at 1280-81 (emphasis added).
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performer, any unauthorized recording by a person
receiving the broadcast constitutes copyright
infringement of the sound recording or motion
picture, notwithstanding that the infringer actually
copied the live performance directly, and not the
fixation thereof."'
The result flowing from the flawed logic in Martignon would be
as follows: Audience member asks and receives permission to
record the live musical performance but only for his or her own
personal use. Another audience member surreptitiously records
the live musical performance.
Both audience members, however, proceed to have duplicates
made and sell and distribute those duplicate copies. Under
Martignon, the first audience member would have infringed on the
performers' Section 106 exclusive rights because the audience
member exceeded the limited license granted - one copy for
personal use. The other audience member, a classic bootlegger,
would not have violated any federal laws, copyright or otherwise.
Why? Because the Copyright Act does not protect unfixed works,
a fact not in dispute, and because prosecution via 18 U.S.C. §
2319A is not possible under Martignon, which has declared the
statute unconstitutional.
The federal criminal antibootlegging statute creates a new
offense, a new cause of action. It is not a copyright or copyrightlike law, but if it were, strictly for arguendo purposes, the live
musical performance is fixed at the time the unauthorized
recording has been made.
Responding to the "limited Times" argument is equally nonproblematic. If one views the statute in the same erroneous
fashion as does the Martignon court, copyright-like, a time limit is
needed. On the other hand, acknowledging 18 U.S.C. § 2319A for
what it is - a federal criminal statute - calls for a statute of

limitations. To satisfy Martignon's classification, that 18 U.S.C. §
2319A creates a new copyright right, it is mere common sense
141. Id. at 1280 (emphasis added).
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then to look to Section 302 of the Copyright Act, which specifies
142
that protection extends for the life of the author plus 70 years.
Joint works and works-made-for-hire are subject to a 95-year or
120-year span of protection.'43
The appropriate durational component, however, is a statute of
limitations. Professor Nimmer readily resolves the lack of an
express statute of limitations in his discussion of the civil
antibootlegging statute by stating that it appears fitting to follow
the general copyright three-year statute of limitations.'"
Moreover, Congress' failure to include an express statute of
limitations is not unusual. 145 The appropriate statute of limitations
for the new criminal cause of action for bootlegging can be found
in the same provision of the Copyright Act cited by Professor
Nimmer as suitable for the civil cause of action. Section 507(a)
requires that a criminal proceeding must be brought within five
years after the cause of action arose. 146 Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. §
2319A is not fundamentally inconsistent with the Copyright
Clause.
V. UNPOPULAR DOES NOT EQUATE TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The federal antibootlegging legislation is not without its critics.
Perhaps the most stinging disapproval coming from Professor
Nimmer himself. In a law review article published one year after
142. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2005).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b), (c) (2005).
144. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §8E.03[C][5] at 8E-21 (referencing 17 U.S.C.
§ 507(b)). "For although bootlegging is distinct from copyright infringement,
that section, after all, applies to any "civil action [which] shall be maintained
under the provisions of this title," in which the later-added Chapter 11 appears."

Id.
145. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (noting that
many federal statutes lack a statute of limitations and when this is the case,
federal courts are to look for the most appropriate statute of limitations to apply
to the statute at issue). See also Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319,
323 (1989). "Congress not infrequently fails to supply an express statute of
limitations when it creates a federal cause of action." Id.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2005).
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the 1994 enactment of antibootlegging federal statutes, Nimmer
proclaimed that the URAA antibootlegging and restoration of
copyright protection for foreign works provisions marked the end
47
of copyright as we know it.1
We witnessed, on December 8 [1994], a major
change of constitutional proportions; even more
significantly, we experienced the first tremors of
certain tectonic shifts in United States sovereignty;
and, perhaps most significantly, we undertook a sea
change in defining the end that copyright serves, the
identity of the master in the copyright sphere. 148

If indeed the new master of copyright is the world
of international trade, if the events of last December
are sustained in a broad construction, then the
Constitution must simply follow compliantly
behind. Copyright today serves not the needs of
authors nor even the popular good, whereby works
are relegated to the public domain to become the
heritage of all humanity and copyright is simply a
temporary way station to reward authors on the
road to that greater good. Instead of those goals, the
balance of payments has become all-decisive.
Whatever bows to that god is now worthy of
49
implementation. 1
Like the court in Martignon, Nimmer viewed the federal
antibootlegging statutes as creating new copyright protection for
live musical performances and that the statutes do so in bold
defiance of the Writings fixation requirement.15 Other authorities
respectfully disagree with Professor Nimmer. For example, in his
147.
148.
149.
150.

David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385 (1995).
Id. at 1385.
Id. at 1416.
Id. at 1409-11.
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scholarly paper, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms,
Professor Thomas B. Nachbar provided a well reasoned response
to those critics who insist that the limitations of one constitutional
clause permeate all other constitutional clauses.
The overwhelming view among commentators is that the
Intellectual Property Clause's limits apply to all of Congress's
powers and therefore that Congress may not look to other Article I,
Section 8 powers in order to avoid those limits. The prevailing
wisdom is that the limits in the Intellectual Property Clause, for
instance that exclusive rights be granted only to "Writings" and
"Discoveries" or that they be for "limited Times," must be read as
applying to all of Congress's powers in order to be true to the text
and structure of Article I and to the idea of a federal government of
limited and enumerated powers. To do otherwise would render the
Intellectual Property Clause superfluous and its well-defined limits
null. The prevailing wisdom is wrong. 5 '
This article does not rely on Professor Nachbar arguments but
includes reference to them to further constitutional jurisprudence
dialogue. This article does argue that the declarations "copyright
as we know it have ended" and "traditional copyright no longer
exists" are analogous to parents who are shocked at today's hair,
clothing, and music - even live musical performances.
After all, the original Copyright Act of 1790 protected only
charts, maps and books, and the "limited Times" was fourteen
years.'5 2 Prior to the 1994 enactment of federal antibootlegging
legislation, copyright had grown considerably from its humble
beginnings. The protected subject matter expanded to include
pictorial, graphic, sculpture, sound recordings, motion pictures,
and even architectural works.' 53
Moreover, the fourteen-year
54
the author plus fifty years.' 1
of
life
protection profoundly grew to
151. Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and ConstitutionalNorms,
104 COLUM. L. REv. 272, 274-76 (2004).
152. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2005).
154. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193 (discussing the constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 which further enlarged the durational
component to life plus seventy years).
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Accordingly, it is difficult to accept that enacting a criminal and
civil cause of action to address the widespread activity of
bootlegging somehow shattered the concept of two centuries' of
"traditional copyright."
VI. CONCLUSION

The unauthorized recording of live musical performances for
pecuniary gain and its substantial impact on interstate commerce
was established decades ago in Dowling, a Supreme Court case
wherein the defendants were engaged in a coast-to-coast operation
to distribute and sell unauthorized copies of live performances of
Elvis Presley. 55 As with legal trade, bootlegging ascended to the
international level and was then addressed through broad
international trade agreements. Congress elected to provide the
treaty-required protection for performers of live musical events in
the United States by creating both a civil and criminal cause of
action.
The fast-track procedures permissibly employed by Congress to
enact the comprehensive package of multilateral trade treaties did
not leave in its wake the neat and tidy trail of legislative history
created when legislation is enacted through the deliberative
process. Irrespective of both the lack of legislative history and any
mistaken belief Congress might have held as to the source of its
authority, Congress was well within its Commerce Clause powers
to create a new cause of action for performers whose live musical
events are essentially stolen, mass duplicated, and sold for profit,
thereby depressing the legitimate music market.
No amount of sifting through near non-existent legislative
history and jumping on an occasional use of the word "copyright"
in report titles and categories will render invalid what are in fact
constitutionally sound civil and criminal antibootlegging statutes.
Attempts to reach this outcome through insistence that the statutes
are "copyright laws" that expand the exclusive rights enjoyed by
copyright holders under Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976

'55Dowling, 473 U.S. 207.
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are fraught with flawed logic and unsubstantiated conclusions.
The statutes do not create a new copyright right any more than
the Federal Kidnapping Act expands the rights enjoyed under the
Bill of Rights - the right not to be kidnapped across state lines.
Congress, on occasion, has exceeded its enumerated grants of
power.
This, however, is not one of those occasions.
Accordingly, the Martignon holding along with the replication of
its flawed reasoning found in KISS Catalog, which struck down
the civil antibootlegging cause of action, should be reversed.
Nancy L. Datres
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